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Structural Antecedents of Corporate Network Evolution 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
While most network studies adopt a static view, we argue that corporate social 
networks are subject to endogenous dynamics of cognitive path dependence and self-
reinforcing power relations. Over time, these dynamics drive corporate networks to 
become increasingly focused (i.e., more homogeneous, stable, and tightly knit). More 
focused networks induce organisations to perpetuate existing routines, at the expense 
of developing new capabilities. We examine the role of organisational structure in 
maintaining balanced, rather than focused, networks, so that business organisations 
can realise progressive and timely adjustments to their evolving environments. We 
develop a theoretical argument, illustrated with the divergent network adjustment 
patterns of two large, mature companies, suggesting that business organisations with 
the following structural antecedents are likely to maintain balanced networks: the 
concurrence of centralisation and decentralisation; a high degree of differentiation 
and an intermediate level of integration; and an intermediate degree of formalisation. 
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Structural  Antecedents of Corporate Network Evolution 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Three decades of social network research have spawned numerous insights into the 
different aspects that make up the relational lifeblood of business organisations. The 
structures, processes, contingencies, and outcomes of social networks have been 
theorised and empirically tested at the interpersonal, interunit, and interorganisational 
levels (for overviews, see Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and 
Tsai, 2004; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston, 2006). At the same time, researchers 
have predominantly adopted a „snapshot‟ view of social networks, often taking 
existing network structures for granted and (implicitly) assuming that these structures 
are static. The eschewing of questions regarding network origin and dynamics leaves 
unanswered important questions as to the factors that account for the emergence and 
evolution of organisational networks (Brass et al., 2004).  
A few studies have addressed the dynamics of social networks. Koka, 
Madhavan, and Prescott (2006) focused on network responses to exogenous 
environmental shocks. Hite and Hesterley (2001) discussed network evolution at early 
stages of corporate development. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), Baum, Shipilov, and 
Rowley (2003), Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith (2005), and Kim, Oh, and 
Swaminathan (2006) studied the endogenous emergence and evolution of 
interorganisational networks. Drawing on insights from the evolutionary economics 
literature (e.g, Becker, 2004; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
our paper also addresses endogenous processes of network evolution. In particular, we 
focus on the ways in which organisational structure impacts the network development 
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patterns of large, mature firms. By addressing the largely uncharted crossroads of 
organisational structure and network dynamics, we respond to Jacobides‟ (2007: 470) 
call that “we should study in greater detail how the division of labor in the 
organization implicitly leads to a “cognitive architecture,” how divisionalization 
shapes search, and how it affects an organization‟s ability to adapt and respond.” The 
challenge of organisational structure or design is “to divide the tasks into manageable, 
specialized jobs, yet coordinate the tasks so that the firm reaps the benefits of 
harmonious action” (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003: 292). Since organisational 
structures both enable and constrain action (Granovetter, 1985), the particular ways in 
which organisations divide and coordinate their interdependent tasks will favour or 
hamper the establishment and maintenance of interactions among (both internal and 
external) actors. Organisational structure is thus likely to impact network development 
patterns. 
The essence of our argument is that evolving power relations and cognitive 
experiences tend to shape corporate social networks in such a way that the ties of 
these networks become ever more stable, homogeneous, and tightly knit. Such  
focused networks may bear their fruits in the short term since organisations become 
increasingly skilled at exploiting existing capabilities – as evidenced by the 
perpetuation of extant routines. But focused networks also hamper organisations in the 
ability to adapt their capabilities to the requirements of their business environments 
when the latter change. As a result, organisations whose focused networks become at 
odds with environmental requirements need to proceed to leapfrog network 
adjustments such as the acquisition of organisations with the „right type‟ of ties. In 
contrast to this punctuated equilibrium model of network adjustment, other 
organisations manage to  continuously rejuvenate their social networks while also 
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fostering existing relations. They thus maintain balanced social networks, which 
continue to provide the information necessary for both deepening existing capabilities 
and developing new ones.  
The impact of structural antecedents on social network dynamics has, to our 
knowledge, as yet only been studied in the context of small, entrepreneurial firms 
(Maurer and Ebers, 2006). We build theoretical arguments pertaining to social 
network dynamics of large, mature firms, and illustrate these with the different 
patterns of network development in two major companies, DSM and Philips. We 
analyse social networks at the organisational level. While recognising the importance 
of individual-level networks (Burt, 2005) and knowledge heterogeneity (Felin and 
Hesterly, 2007; Rothaermel and Hess, 2007), we focus on organisation-level networks 
since the latter are more than the sum of individual networks. Corporate networks 
include the synergetic interactions between individual networks, which remain 
unnoticed when merely aggregating personal networks. We are thus interested in 
network evolution at the organisational level, all the more since we expect the impact 
of individual actors and their personal networks to be limited in our large, mature 
focal organisations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first detail our empirical 
method and data. The next section discusses the endogenous dynamics of social 
networks; brief descriptions of the network evolution of our two focal firms are 
followed by a theoretical analysis of the forces that shape endogenous evolution 
towards focused networks. We next identify structural characteristics that enable 
companies to counter this tendency and maintain balanced networks, illustrated with 
empirical findings from both firms. We finally discuss the implications of our findings 
and sketch opportunities for future studies. 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The outcomes of this study follow from the constant iteration between insights from 
the literature and empirical observations. Given the important role of the field 
insights, we first detail our empirical technique and data sources. 
 
Method and Data 
The case study is an appropriate method to investigate issues characterised by 
dynamic complexity – particularly „how‟ and „why‟ queries (Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1994). 
Since we were interested in an in-depth understanding of why and how structural 
antecedents shape the evolution of social networks, we chose to perform case studies. 
Another rationale for applying this method is that case studies lend themselves to 
exploring research areas for which existing theories fall short (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Suddaby, 2006) or lack illustration (Siggelkow, 2007). As the literature does not 
articulate the interrelations between our focal constructs, we used case studies to 
explore their interactions.  
Following the principle of theoretical sampling or the deliberate selection of 
cases to ensure that the empirical setting accommodates the focal constructs and 
relations (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), we selected two companies that were large 
enough to have complex social networks and old enough to show distinct patterns of 
network evolution. At the same time, we searched for contrast between a company 
with a relatively balanced social network and a firm with a focused set of relations. 
The use of such „polar types‟ facilitates the detection of contrasting patterns 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). After a preliminary study, we selected two large, 
long-lived companies that were active in highly competitive industries: DSM, a 
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chemicals company with an apparently balanced social network, and Philips Lighting, 
the division of Royal Philips Electronics dealing with lamps and related products, 
which seemed to have a relatively focused network.  
We conducted 33 in-depth interviews with managers of the focal organisations 
over the period April 2004 – January 2008. The selection of managers was guided by 
their roles as active participants in, and observers of, social networks and corporate 
structures and practices. To ensure variety and complementarity of views, we 
interviewed managers at different organisational levels (the corporation (in the case of 
DSM), the division (at Philips), the business group, and the business unit) and in 
different substantive areas (general management, corporate strategy and planning, 
marketing, R&D, information technology, human resources, and logistics). The 
interviews lasted one to two hours (with an average length of 90 minutes) and were 
mostly conducted in the respondent‟s working environment. Some interviews were 
open-ended, while others were semi-structured. Respondents reflected on past and 
present developments. Most interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, while 
detailed notes were taken in the remaining interviews. This resulted in 370 pages of 
transcripts and notes. Follow-up phone calls were made when further clarification was 
needed. Additional evidence was provided by 230 secondary documents (including 
policy documents, presentations, articles in magazines, annual reports, and 
monographs on the companies), electronic media (internet and intranet), and field 
observations. 
The process of data collection, analysis, and interpretation was driven by 
sensitising concepts, which are interpretive devices that are used as a starting point for 
a qualitative study (Bowen, 2006). In the view of Blumer (1954), theory is of value 
only if it can be fruitfully connected with the empirical world. This was precisely our 
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concern in conducting the case studies. We wanted to explore the extent to which our 
theoretically derived concepts and relations were actually grounded on real-life 
phenomena. The sensitising concepts were either pre-established on the basis of the 
literature study or emerged as apparently salient during the data analysis process. 
Relevant passages of our primary and secondary data were related to the different 
concepts. After a first round of analysis, certain sensitising concepts were merged with 
others or deleted because they turned out not to be sufficiently relevant. The 
sensitising concepts were operationalised by looking at concrete manifestations of the 
initial concepts. For example, we operationalised „focused networks‟ as relatively 
long-lasting, frequent, and intense relations among actors with similar educational 
backgrounds and professional experiences.  
We systematically perused all information sources. We checked for consistency 
by comparing the views of the different respondents. Further triangulation was 
obtained by comparing primary data with the various secondary sources and by 
comparing the individual analyses of different researchers (Yin, 1994). During the 
process of data analysis, we regularly returned to the literature and compared the 
preliminary empirical outcomes with our conceptual insights. These combined 
insights further framed our subsequent data analysis. After having structured salient 
passages of the different data sources per focal element, we then related these 
elements to one another to construct a causal chain of evidence per case (Yin, 1994). 
We considered different causality patterns and analysed which ones were 
substantiated by the data. Finally, we made a cross-case comparison to assess the 
similarities and differences of both companies (Huberman and Miles, 1994). The 
empirical outcomes are represented in the following sections. 
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NETWORK EVOLUTION PATTERNS 
How do corporate networks evolve? Are they subject to general forces that lead to 
isomorphic evolution patterns or do divergent dynamics entail heterogeneous network 
developments? To explore this question, we studied the network dynamics of two 
large companies. We start by sketching the company profiles and the composition and 
evolution of their social networks. After briefly reviewing the impact of network 
configuration on organisational capabilities, we theorise on the evolutionary dynamics 
of corporate networks, highlighting the factors that are likely to endogenously shape 
network development.  
 
Empirical Patterns of Network Evolution 
DSM 
DSM is a Dutch-based firm with global operations in specialty chemicals and 
materials. In 1902, DSM (Dutch State Mines) was founded as a state-owned coal-
mining company. After a century of growth and diversification, DSM‟s portfolio 
consisted of three clusters: „Life Science Products‟ (including biotechnology), 
„Performance Materials‟ (particularly elastomers, resins, and plastics), and „Industrial 
Chemicals‟ (mainly petrochemicals). In response to the increasingly global, 
competitive, and turbulent business environment of the 1990s, DSM decided to adopt 
a multiple-specialist strategy and focus on a small number of areas to realise scale 
economies in research and production (Van Rooij, 2007). The company largely 
divested its petrochemicals business to the Saudi Arabian company SABIC in 2002 
and focused on Life Science Products (later on split into Nutrition and Pharma) and 
Performance Materials. Each of these businesses is composed of relatively 
autonomous Business Groups with their own profit-and-loss responsibility. The 
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corporate Innovation Center nurtures new businesses based on radical technologies. 
Despite the divestment of its petrochemicals business, DSM‟s sales have 
progressively grown over the past five years, resulting in a 2008 sales figure of EUR 
9.3 billion for 23,600 employees. The company shows an average net income before 
taxes of 10%, which is comparable to the performance of other chemical companies 
but remarkable in the light of its recent transformation. 
DSM has well-developed internal networks. The „Business Strategy Dialogues‟ 
and „Corporate Strategy Dialogues‟ are institutionalised networks. These interactive, 
consensus-seeking processes assure the bottom-up stream of innovative strategic ideas 
within the firm, at the Business Group and corporate levels, respectively. In the 
Business Strategy Dialogues, relatively homogeneous groups of managers and other 
employees discuss how to revitalise their existing businesses. In the Corporate 
Strategy Dialogues, units engaged in new ventures have discussions with colleagues 
from short-term-oriented operational businesses, board members, and others about the 
future corporate strategy. Furthermore, heterogeneous innovation teams of 
representatives from different Business Groups seek to create synergies by developing 
new activities that span several Business Groups. The company is also engaged in 
numerous external networks. Operational Business Groups have frequent value-chain-
related contacts with customers and suppliers to improve existing products and 
processes. Other entities have relatively weak, heterogeneous, and recent ties with 
knowledge partners such as universities, research laboratories, and technology-based 
start-ups to explore new business areas. 
DSM‟s networks were traditionally inward-oriented. Strong ties within Business 
Groups and weak ties between Business Groups were successful in a relatively stable, 
technology-driven business environment. External contacts were parsimonious and 
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confined to some fundamental research projects with selected universities. When 
globalisation induced the company to pursue a different strategy, DSM also had to 
reconfigure its networks. The divestment of the petrochemicals business led to a 
certain contraction of its social networks. External partners grew increasingly 
important and the firm started to ever more rely on open innovation to tap into 
externally developed knowledge (Kirschbaum, 2005). The cooperation with, and 
direct participation in, external start-ups around the globe became crucial for 
exploring new but related technological areas. The company also invested in five 
venture-capital funds focusing on Life Science Products and Performance Materials, 
leading to „spin-ins‟ (i.e, the in-licencing of technologies) once externally developed 
knowledge has sufficiently crystallised (Meijer, 2006; InterConnect, 2007). In sum, 
DSM‟s social network shows a relatively sustained balance, with strong ties within 
Business Groups being complemented by regular contacts with other Business Groups 
and with a progressive adjustment of its external network.  
 
Philips 
Philips is a Dutch-based company with global activities in the development, 
production, and marketing of a variety of electric and electronic products, including 
Consumer Life Style Products (formerly Consumer Electronics, Domestic Appliances, 
and Personal Care), Health Care, and Lighting. Philips Lighting, the division on which 
we have focused our research („Division‟), operates in the area in which Philips has 
been active since its inception in 1891 (ICFAI, 2005). The Division has progressively 
evolved from an industrial pioneer in incandescent lighting to a supplier of all kinds of 
lighting. Being an oligopolist in a predictable industry – together with OSRAM and 
General Electrics – Philips Lighting has faced relatively stable markets in Western 
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Europe and North America. Emerging markets (in particular, Brazil, Russia, China, 
and India) are much more competitive, complex, and unstable. New technologies 
(especially LED or solid-state lighting), the shift in orientation from components and 
products to applications and solutions, and the replacement of incandescent bulbs with 
energy-efficient lighting have further intensified environmental turbulence in the early 
2000s (Bartlett, 2006). The Divison spent EUR 4 billion to acquire several producers 
and distributors of LED technology and luminaires (including Lumileds, Partners in 
Lighting, Color Kinetics, and Genlyte) in the period 2005-2008. Philips Lighting has 
grown strongly over the past five years, leading to a 2008 sales figure of EUR 7.1 
billion for 57,000 employees. The Division is market leader and has a relatively high 
average net income of some 12%.  
Philips Lighting‟s internal networks are predominantly stable, homogeneous, 
and tightly coupled within Business Groups. Numerous and intensive contacts take 
place among colleagues who share core values. The similarity of backgrounds of 
employees in higher functions is relatively strong and is stimulated by tenure length, 
although „external blood‟ has recently enhanced employee diversity. Most information 
needs are met by relying on existing (internal) sources. While the internal networks of 
most Business Groups show a strong focus, those of some groups are more loosely 
coupled and show a certain degree of heterogeneity. Business Groups have few 
contacts with other Business Groups. The Division used to be reticent in establishing 
external contacts. Exceptions are key account managers and senior managers, who 
represent the Division in its contacts with major customers to facilitate the exchange 
of fine-grained information and to build trust and commitment. The Division also 
engages in close cooperation with suppliers, production sites, distribution centres, and 
customers to achieve operational excellence. 
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While long-lasting and strong ties tend to reinforce the connections among 
relatively homogeneous internal and external actors, it was recognised that some 
markets, such as LED lighting, are highly turbulent and that the Divison did not have 
the required capabilities to adequately serve these markets. In an effort to enter novel 
markets in which it had not developed its own research, production, and marketing 
connections, Philips Lighting acquired a number of leading companies in these 
markets. Furthermore, the Division hired employees with more heterogeneous 
backgrounds, stimulated cooperation among, and engaged in partnerships with, small 
companies that were active in the upcoming markets. These new ties are looser and 
more heterogeneous in nature than the more traditional ones, which still dominate 
within the Divison. To summarise, the Division‟s network consists mainly of 
relatively disconnected Business Group clusters of homogeneous, stable, and cohesive 
ties, with a recent leapfrog expansion of externally acquired clusters for novel 
markets. 
The two companies thus differ markedly as to the composition and evolution 
patterns of their social networks. DSM has over time maintained a relatively balanced 
network – both internally (with regular contacts within and between Business Groups) 
and externally (with a continuous search for external adjustments). This contrasts with 
Philips Lighting‟s network, which consists of relatively disconnected Business Group 
clusters and which after a long period of increasing focus has recently evolved through 
radical external network adjustments. We see within Philips Lighting no equivalent of 
DSM‟s continuous search for new ideas in the environment, nor of mechanisms for 
ensuring diversity of internal networks, like DSM‟s Corporate Strategy Dialogues. 
How are these network configurations related to the capabilities of both 
organisations? And how to account for these divergent configurations and evolution 
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patterns? We now provide a brief review of the impact of network configuration on 
organisational capabilities, followed by a theoretical argument to explain endogenous 
network evolution. 
 
Network Configuration and Organisational Capabilities 
Social networks consist of internal and external links on which organisations can draw 
to obtain critical resources, such as information. Organisations that are strongly 
embedded in social networks have relatively good access to technologies and other 
resources, strengthening their competitive position (Dyer and Singh, 1998; McEvily 
and Zaheer, 1999; Uzzi, 1996; Gobbo and Olsson, 2010). Two archetypal 
configurations are bridging and bonding networks (Putnam, 2000; Adler and Kwon, 
2002).  
Bridging networks consist of weak, sparsely connected ties. Network actors 
have few direct connections to one another and communication is limited in frequency 
and intensity. Such networks are conducive to the generation of a large quantity of 
heterogeneous information from a variety of sources (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999), so 
that organisations obtain the insights required to keep up with the turbulence and 
complexity of their environments (Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Morgan, 1997; 
Nonaka, 1994) while avoiding the pitfall of developing a dominant view where 
heterodoxy is not tolerated (Janis, 1972). This network type minimises tie redundancy 
and leads to the maximisation of nodes and heterogeneity of information (Watts, 
1999; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008), which is important in the face of time and 
resource constraints (Hansen, Podolny, and Pfeffer, 2001; Rowley, Behrens, and 
Krackhardt, 2000).   
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Bridging networks are valuable for organisations that seek to broaden their 
scope and explore new, relatively unrelated activities (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005; 
Gobbo and Olsson, 2010). As the new information needed deviates from the existing 
knowledge stock, it is unlikely that existing network actors can meet these new needs 
(Collis and Montgomery, 1998). Instead of tapping from existing sources that have 
satisfied past information needs, organisations then need to establish contacts with 
actors outside their existing networks who can offer the qualitatively different 
knowledge required to explore new types of activities (March, 1991). Since it is 
unclear upfront which new contacts will yield the needed information, organisations 
will need to establish a large number of weak relations with heterogeneous actors 
(Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Rowley et al., 2000; Simsek, Lubatkin, and 
Floyd, 2003).
2
 The novelty, number, and variety of these contacts ensure the inflow of 
dissimilar ideas, required to deviate from existing paths and fill knowledge gaps 
(Wuyts, Colombo, Dutta, and Nooteboom, 2005; Argote, 1999; Nonaka, 1994). 
Bridging networks are, therefore, conducive to the development of new, unrelated 
organisational capabilities.  
Bonding networks are made up of strong, densely connected ties. Actors have 
frequent and intensive direct contacts with many other network actors. These 
networks produce common social norms and sanctions that facilitate the development 
of trust and cooperative exchanges of information (Coleman, 1988; Uzzi, 1997). This 
social infrastructure of strong, densely connected ties also creates a common cognitive 
and normative framework in which actors understand one another (Obstfeld, 2005), 
                                                          
2
 It can also be argued that strong ties are required for exploration, since the elaboration of new ideas 
calls for intensive exchanges of especially tacit information among actors concerned (Hansen et al., 
2001; Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2005). The different views can be related to dissimilar definitions of 
explorative learning: if the latter is confined to the generation and initial combination of new ideas, 
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and are motivated to overcome barriers to information sharing (Hargadon and Sutton, 
1997; Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  
The value of bonding networks stems from their ability to provide focus and 
deepen existing knowledge stocks. Strong ties with a relatively homogeneous pool of 
actors are instrumental, because the exchange of fine-grained information requires 
intensive interactions (Rowley et al., 2000; Simsek et al., 2003) and similar technical 
and normative backgrounds to understand one another and strive towards well-
determined objectives (Wuyts et al., 2005; Nooteboom, 2000). Existing network 
actors with a strong collaboration track record and an intimate knowledge of existing 
activities build on, and jointly deepen, organisational knowledge stocks (Weick and 
Westley, 1996; Weick and Roberts, 1993). Bonding networks thus stimulate the 
further development of existing organisational capabilities.   
While bridging networks thus stimulate the development of new capabilities and 
bonding networks deepen existing ones, such network configurations may not be 
invariant. In contrast with the „Austrian‟ view of quasi-unconstrained network 
adaptation, we will now argue that social networks are subject to endogenous 
dynamics that tend to turn bridging networks increasingly into bonding networks. 
 
Endogenous Network Evolution 
Most network scholars, especially those studying network structures, have adopted a 
static view, analysing network „snapshots‟ at a particular point in time. The literature 
has remained relatively silent on the evolution of social networks. While the dynamic 
effects of exogenous factors such as environmental uncertainty and munificence 
                                                                                                                                                                      
weak ties are optimal; the further development and implementation of these new ideas calls for stronger 
ties (Hansen, 1999). 
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(Koka et al., 2006) and endogenous interorganisational dynamics (Baum et al., 2003) 
have been addressed, the impact of endogenous dynamics on the evolution of 
organisational networks has so far been ignored (an exception is Maurer and Ebers, 
2006). Burt‟s (2005) exploration of network dynamics can be applied to organisations. 
Invoking the market metaphor of Austrian economics, characterised by movements 
towards equilibria against the backdrop of unevenly and imperfectly distributed 
knowledge, Burt argues that network entrepreneurs capitalise on profit opportunities 
by filling „structural holes‟. They connect otherwise unrelated actors and receive a 
premium for their role as information brokers. Network entrepreneurs will continue to 
establish new ties until social networks have become so dense that most actors are 
directly connected to one another and profit opportunities have faded. Networks have 
then reached an equilibrium.  
While Burt‟s argument is valuable by recognising that network dynamics may 
be driven by economic incentives, the underlying assumption of atomic, unembedded 
network actors is unrealistic since the behaviour of actors is enabled and constrained 
by the social context within which these actors operate (Granovetter, 1985). Following 
other scholars adopting an „embedded‟ view of network evolution (e.g., Marquis, 
2003; Walker, Kogut, and Shan, 1997; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), our argument recognises 
the critical influence of social context and corporate history on network development. 
Instead of assuming unconstrained network adaptation driven by entrepreneurial 
individuals, we argue that network dynamics are path dependent, shaped by collective 
processes of cognition and power. In particular, we develop the idea that the 
accumulation of cognitive experiences and the concentration of power render social 
networks increasingly focused: they tend to become more homogeneous, stable, and 
tightly knit over time. 
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Organisations see their scope evolve from broad to narrow after having entered 
new areas of business (Nooteboom, 2000). When firms pursue new paths, they 
establish novel contacts. In this explorative stage, they search for, select, and retain 
fruitful business opportunities. Organisations do so by establishing a large number of 
weak ties to optimise the quantity and diversity of information against the backdrop of 
constrained (human) resources (Baum et al., 2000; Granovetter, 1973). Since it is 
unknown upfront which ties will turn out to be valuable, organisations will explore a 
large diversity of options (Baum et al., 2000; Elfring and Hulsink, 2007). At the 
outset, variety is thus crucial and the organisational scope is very broad. Many 
explorative ties are, however, ephemeral: they are severed or fade away after a short 
time because they are not perceived as (immediately) fruitful (Burt, 2002). The 
outselection of many recent ties and the retention of a limited number of new ties then 
reduces the initial network variety and organisational scope. As time passes, 
organisational activities become increasingly exploitative in nature because scarce 
resources tend to be applied for meeting short-term (exploitative) imperatives and 
because initially successful practices are self-reinforcing (March, 1991).  
Business organisations are likely to stick to initially adopted practices that meet 
their needs – “the “accidents” of organizational genealogy tend to be perpetuated” 
(Cyert and March, 1992: 39) – since their behaviour is „satisficing‟, rather than 
optimising. This can be explained from the incapacity of organisations to fully 
understand and predict the complexity of their business environments (Cyert and 
March, 1992; Simon, 1976). Organisations use heuristics (i.e., rules of thumb that bias 
new information in favour of existing mental frames), which favour path dependence 
since familiar solutions are applied to prevailing problems. As a result, new 
information tends to be interpreted in the light of existing, retrievable stocks of 
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knowledge (Bazerman, 1997; Cyert and March, 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
Indeed, the „absorptive capacity‟ of organisations is positively related to prior, 
cognitively close (sources of) information, because organisation members can easily 
acknowledge and assimilate the importance of such knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). Such privileging of existing knowledge practices and areas limits the variety of 
knowledge search and stimulates the development of a dominant logic among 
decision-makers, thus leading to cognitive path dependence (Bettis and Wong, 2003). 
Organisational scope thus tends to narrow down over time and organisational 
capabilities tend to develop along increasingly established paths. The network 
implication of cognitive path dependence is that organisations continue established 
„valuable‟ contacts with actors who provide „more of the same‟ knowledge. Like-
minded actors reinforce their mutual ties (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001) 
because of the perceived (cognitive) benefits of information exchanges (Krackhardt, 
1992; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). The accumulation of shared experiences and 
mutual attachment further reinforces actors to perpetuate long-lasting ties (Kim et al., 
2006; Baum et al., 2003; Maurer and Ebers, 2006). 
A second time-related effect is the emergence of dominant coalitions between 
actors owing to power dynamics. Actors who (are perceived to) contribute 
significantly to organisational performance increasingly accumulate power (Miller, 
1993). They obtain additional resources to further enhance organisational performance 
(Hiller and Hambrick, 2005). As a result, „successful‟ actors obtain a relatively central 
and hence powerful position in the organisational network, since other actors rely on 
their resources (Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; Koka et al., 2006) and, hence, 
organisations become increasingly dependent on them (Steier and Greenwood, 2000). 
These „successful‟ actors are likely to form dominant coalitions with other actors who 
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have proven to be „successful‟ (Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Baum et al., 
2003) and to marginalise or exclude actors whose added value is perceived as 
insufficient, or whose inputs do not visibly pay off in the short run (Denrell and 
March, 2001). Their competencies may be related to areas that the dominant coalitions 
within organisations do not wish to exploit because the existing activity fields are 
perceived to be more important (Bettis and Wong, 2003; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). 
This entails a self-reinforcing process of power accumulation and exclusion in which 
few new contacts are established, and relations with „unsuccessful‟ or „heterodox‟ 
actors are terminated (McPherson et al., 2001; Levitt and March, 1995; Miller, 1993). 
This process of convergence is likely to continue as long as organisational 
performance is sufficiently high, because the latter provides legitimacy to dominant 
actors and precludes the necessity to change (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang, 
2005; Johnson, 1988; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Power dynamics thus reduce 
the organisational scope and create inertia. 
In sum, cognitive and power dynamics lead to path dependence with self-
reinforcing processes that tend to decrease network diversity and increase tie strength 
and duration. The concomitant exploitation of existing practices will increasingly 
crowd out the exploration of new activities (Benner and Tushman, 2002). An 
important consequence of this endogenous process of network focusing is that the 
(internal and external) organisational network may gradually become less fit when the 
external environment changes (Burgelman, 2002; Steier and Greenwood, 2000; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Indeed, attachment to existing network actors 
impedes organisational network reconfiguration, even when these actors no longer 
provide the required resources (Seabright, Levinthal, and Fichman, 1992). As a result, 
initially formed networks, even when non-optimal, may persist over time and ensue 
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path dependence (Walker et al., 1997; Marquis, 2003). Yet, as illustrated in our cases, 
some organisations succeed in overcoming this network inertia (Kim et al., 2006) and 
reorient their strategic scope to coevolve with their changing environments (Lewin 
and Volberda, 1999; Volberda and Lewin, 2003), while others fail to do so (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984, 1989; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). This raises the question of 
why some organisations are better than others at avoiding the trap of increasing 
network focus. 
 
STRUCTURAL ANTECEDENTS OF NETWORK EVOLUTION 
We have argued that social networks have an endogenous tendency towards less 
diversity, increased stability, and enhanced tie strength, but we have also suggested 
that this tendency may be mitigated by particular organisational antecedents. We now 
argue that the ways in which organisations are structured to divide and coordinate 
activities will affect their patterns of social interaction, both within the organisation 
and across organisational borders. In line with Miller and Dröge (1986), we focus on 
three important determinants of organisational structure: the locus of decision-making 
power, the degree of specialisation and integration, and the importance of formal 
rules. These elements have important influences on power dynamics and cognitive 
processes, and hence on the formation and development of network ties.  
 Our reasoning is that organisational structure parameters impact on both the 
power dynamics and the cognitive processes that lead to the tendency towards 
increasing network focus. Organisational structure is directly, practically by definition,  
connected to the power relations within the firm. The endogenous network dynamics 
described in the previous section are partly linked to (changes in) the organisational 
structure. For example, organisational structure enables and constrains a dominant 
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coalition to accumulate power and marginalise less central players in the firm. 
Likewise, organisational structure „channels‟ cognitive processes by facilitating or 
hampering information-processing interactions. We maintain that structural 
parameters will also indirectly impact on organisational network dynamics. This 
indirect influence works through the organisational routines that are closely connected 
to the development and maintenance of corporate social networks. 
Routines are repetitive, recognisable patterns of interdependent actions, which 
involve multiple actors (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 2005). 
Routines, which constitute repositories of organisational capabilities (Becker, Lazaric, 
Nelson, and Winter, 2005), are thus the outcomes of sustained interactions among 
actors. Social networks embody such interactions. Network configuration – in terms 
of heterogeneity, stability, and strength of contacts – shapes the development of 
routines. Interaction patterns among diverse actors are different from those among 
relatively homogeneous actors. Stable network contacts entail more repetitive 
interactions than recently established contacts. And relatively strong ties are 
conducive to the transfer of tacit knowledge and the coordination of actions (Hansen, 
1999; Nonaka, 1994), thus also affecting routines. 
But routines – once established through network interactions – also recursively 
affect the development of these social networks. Feasible routines, which provide 
satisfactory responses to prevailing organisational problems, lead to cognitive path 
dependence. Network actors build upon existing moulds to further elaborate and 
refine the adopted cognitive solutions, thus entailing a  reinforcing cognitive loop 
between organisational routines and networks. Satisficing routines also provide power 
and legitimacy to actors who (are perceived to) have made an important contribution 
to the initial adoption of feasible organisational practices, while heterodox actors 
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become more peripheral. Actors perceived as successful will reinforce the initial 
frames, thus strengthening their positions and entailing an amplifying relationship 
between routines and networks. 
While the stabilising effect of routines has been amply described in the literature 
(e.g., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cyert and March, 1992; Levitt and March, 1995), 
routines are increasingly regarded as sources of both stability and change. Instead of 
viewing organisations as mindlessly, habitually, and automatically repeating past 
interaction patterns, several authors (e.g., Becker et al., 2005; Feldman and Pentland, 
2003; Howard-Grenville, 2005) have argued that organisations can also mindfully, 
consciously, and reflexively interpret the past and present to reshape future interaction 
patterns. Feldman and Pentland (2003) and Pentland and Feldman (2005) distinguish 
between the ostensive and performative aspects of a routine, whereby the former 
constitutes the routine‟s „structure‟ or „script‟ and the latter its „agency‟ or „play‟. The 
ostensive aspect provides shared targets, sense-making, and references, whereas the 
performative aspect consists of the creation, maintenance, and modification of 
interaction patterns. This perspective provides the ontology for both stability and 
change of routines. 
We will now discuss how the three types of organisational antecedents 
mentioned above (centralisation-decentralisation, differentiation-integration, and 
formalisation) are likely to affect endogenous network dynamics.   
 
Centralisation and Decentralisation 
Centralisation refers to the concentration of decision-making power within the 
organisation, while decentralisation concerns its dispersion (Mintzberg, 1979). In their 
extreme forms, both centralisation and decentralisation lead to focused networks. 
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Centralisation of decision-making enables top management teams or other central 
bodies, who oversee and manage a portfolio of different activities and units, to wield 
their formal power to overcome resistance from entrenched interests at lower levels 
(Normann, 1971), block existing routines to reframe organisational attention and 
practices (Jacobides, 2007), and reconfigure the social networks of their organisations, 
e.g., through job rotation or „switching‟ (Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine, 1999), by 
imposing collaboration between organisational units that previously operated in 
isolation (Argote, 1999), or by forming strategic alliances with other organisations 
(Hagedoorn, 2006). Such new combinations of actors and units strongly favour the 
development of innovative routines (Becker et al., 2005). Centralised decision-making 
also enables organisations to prescribe rules to promote change, thus fostering the 
development of „metaroutines‟ (i.e., routines to change routines) – and in this way 
corporate innovation may be institutionalised (Adler et al., 1999). These metaroutines 
may thus encourage network rejuvenation to achieve new products and processes, and 
enable organisations to break through lower-level (e.g., divisional or business-group) 
cognitive or power barriers to change and „force‟ network reconfiguration or 
innovation-stimulating routines in a top-down way. 
But a high degree of centralisation entails drawbacks. It will lead to control of 
top managers and central bodies over the internal and external ties of organisational 
actors (Mintzberg, 1979). By detailing the activities of individual units and 
organisational members, the latter will have neither the discretion nor the motivation 
to revitalise their networks (Thompson, 1969). Central planning in large organisations 
is highly complex, since myriads of parameters need to be considered simultaneously 
(Simon, 1973). Especially when interdependencies among organisational actors and 
units are strong, central planning needs to align and coordinate a multitude of actors 
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and factors. Feasible decisions, once achieved, will not be readily reconsidered 
because of (potentially adverse) repercussions on other organisational activities (Cyert 
and March, 1992), which would jeopardise the attained „truce‟ and yield resistance 
from other organisational actors and units (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Furthermore, 
the cognitive complexity of centralised decisions in large organisations makes it hard 
to oversee the ramifications of alternative paths, stimulating a „muddling through‟ 
style without conducting major changes (Lindblom, 1959). As a result, central 
planners will have a low propensity to continuously adjust satisficing decisions 
(Starbuck, 1985), both because of their complexity and the intertwinement of 
divergent interests. The network implications are that existing contacts will not be 
readily reshuffled, thereby strengthening existing ties and stabilising existing 
networks. Likewise, central decision-makers will be reluctant to induce changes of 
existing routines. 
Decentralisation offers the opportunity to flexibly adjust networks and routines 
to environmental changes. Maurer and Ebers (2006) found that, in small 
biotechnology startups, delegation of relationship management from the founder to 
other firm members – a form of decentralization – helped in avoiding external 
network inertia. We expect that decentralisation, up to a certain level, has the same 
effect in large firms. Organisational units may decide to sever obsolete ties and 
establish promising new, diverse ties to develop novel practices to re-establish a fit 
with their (turbulent) business environments, without being constrained by central-
level interference or interdependence with other units (Volberda, 1996; Thompson, 
1969; Mintzberg, 1979). Decentralisation also provides leeway for autonomous units 
to replace outdated routines with practices that meet the demands of evolving business 
environments (Tushman and O‟Reilly, 1996). Furthermore, decentralisation boosts the 
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motivation and creativity to search for new, diverse contacts to develop novel routines 
(Pierce and Delbecq, 1977). Without the cognitive complexity and interest 
multiplicity of centralised decision-making, units are capable and motivated to deploy 
the agility to reframe their routines by changing their target and performance levels. 
Extreme decentralisation, however, favours inertia. Dominant actors in 
autonomous units will build and maintain „ingroups‟ or cliques (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994) that maintain extant local routines (Jacobides, 2007), both to reinforce 
their own power (Miller, 1993) and because of myopia or quasi-blindness to 
opportunities which are relatively far from their own activities (Levitt and March, 
1995). While having the option to continuously adjust their networks, complete 
autonomy induces powerful actors at the decentral level to rely on „old boys‟ 
networks, implying the reinforcement of ties in stable, relatively homogeneous 
networks (McPherson et al., 2001). Furthermore, the relative isolation of autonomous 
units favours „groupthink‟ because of the development of hubris and a tunnel vision 
(Janis, 1972). Hubris, propinquity, and the non-interference of divergent (central) 
devil‟s advocates may lead to overstretched cognitive path dependence. Power 
concentration and myopia at the decentral level will also lead to rigid routines, since 
existing practices are not being questioned. 
The focal cases illustrate the above argument. Originally a very centralised 
company, DSM started to decentralise in the 1990s. At present, many innovation-
related activities are to a large extent the responsibility of the Business Groups, but at 
the same time central coordinating mechanisms have been installed, such as the 
Corporate Research Board (Meijer, 2006). Furthermore, DSM has not only Business 
Strategy Dialogues to better exploit ongoing activities (decentrally), but also centrally 
steered Corporate Strategy Dialogues, involving the company‟s top-30 managers, to 
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explore new ventures stretching across units (Vanhaverbeke and Peeters, 2005), thus 
establishing new, weaker, and more heterogeneous internal ties. The company sets 
clear central boundaries but also decentralises decision-making authority to Business 
Groups (Van Rooij, 2007). This is exemplified by R&D, whereby 20% of the budget 
accrues to centrally assigned priorities (such as nanotechnology and „bioterials‟ (i.e., 
bio-based products), stretching across different Business Groups), while the remaining 
80% are spent on Business Group projects. DSM also establishes and fosters 
numerous external ties, especially with R&D partners (universities, start-up 
companies, …) – some of which are located on the premises of DSM‟s „open 
campus‟. Many of the external ties, which are driven by both corporate and decentral 
actors, are recent and substantively different from the existing contacts.   
By contrast, Philips Lighting‟s social network is made up of clusters of strong, 
stable, and relatively homogeneous ties within highly autonomous (decentralised), 
product-oriented Business Groups. Each Business Group bears the quasi-entire 
responsibility of its own strategic course of action and financial results. While the 
Division sets some strategic directions, the decision-making discretion resides largely 
in the Business Groups. There are very few ties across different Business Groups to 
explore new, joint ventures, although recent attempts have been made to intensify 
collaboration across Business Groups. As one interviewee told us, “the bonds within 
Business Groups are at least a factor five stronger than the [divisional] community 
bonds”. External ties are relatively stable and strong, aiming at the further 
reinforcement of existing activities. The Division seeks to refine existing routines, for 
instance, through the pursuit of operational excellence, rather than to develop new 
types of practices.  
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Since extreme forms of both centralisation and decentralisation will favour the 
development of focused networks and sticky routines, a balanced network calls for a 
blend of central and decentral decision-making. Centralisation provides the power and 
helicopter view to supersede the interests and scopes of individual units, while 
decentralisation favours the grassroots identification of new opportunities and the 
discretion to flexibly adjust to altered environmental conditions. The combination of 
centralisation and decentralisation is thus conducive to the continuous development of 
new, weak, and diverse network ties. DSM, with its relatively balanced social 
network, has such an intermediate degree of centralisation. This situation contrasts 
with Philips Lighting, which has both a highly focused network and a strong tendency 
towards decentralisation. The focal cases thus illustrate our above argument, which we 
summarise as follows: 
Proposition 1: The concurrence of centralisation and decentralisation fosters 
the development of balanced corporate networks. 
 
Differentiation and Integration 
While centralisation and decentralisation refer to the vertical or hierarchical division 
of authority, differentiation and integration refer to the horizontal or heterarchical 
division and coordination of tasks (Nonaka, 1994; Miller and Friesen, 1982). 
Differentiation or „partitioning‟ concerns the specialisation of tasks over different 
units, while integration pertains to the coordination of specialised tasks (Adler et al., 
1999). Differentiation enables specialised units to focus on just a part of the overall 
activities, without being directly constrained by activities in other units. As a result, 
units have ample room to manoeuvre relatively independenly, which enhances their 
operational flexibility (Adler et al., 1999; Volberda, 1996). A differentiated structure 
 28 
also protects new activities, which are vulnerable since they are typically infested with 
uncertainties and can have long lead times before paying off. Creating specialised 
units for new ventures reduces the risk of being croweded out by existing activities 
(Benner and Tushman, 2002; Galbraith, 1982). The existence of a variety of units or 
localised subsystems involves tight coupling within units with loose coupling between 
units (Simon, 1973; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006), thus combining the efficiency 
advantage of the former with the adaptiveness benefit of the latter (Eisenhardt and 
Bhatia, 2002; De Visser et al., 2010).  
The network implication of differentiation is that different clusters of 
organisational subnetworks or cliques develop relatively independently from one 
another, without the constraints of  power games or cognitive frames that prevail in 
other subnetworks (Maurer and Ebers, 2006). This fosters a corporate porfolio of 
diverse, adjustable ties which can easily match the requisite variety of evolving 
business environments (Volberda, 1996). Adding new units to nurture novel activities 
further stimulates the development of new, diverse network ties without being 
constrained by existing spheres of influence (Ruef, 2002). Likewise, a variety of 
routines can flourish and co-exist within the organisational boundaries without 
entailing immediate conflicts over the alignment of routines or the choice of the 
„optimal‟ routine (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Adler et al., 1999).  
Differentiation also entails drawbacks. The relative autonomy of individual 
units may give rise to groupthink and local fiefdoms within each clique, as described 
above. Furthermore, a certain degree of interdependence among specialised units 
exists in virtually all organisations, calling for alignment and coordination 
(Nooteboom, 2000). Examples are the joint use of a particular technology and the 
combination of different functional departments (R&D, procurement, operations, 
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marketing, …) to realise a finished product. Therefore, different units will generally 
have to collaborate to turn inputs into outputs, involving the need to exchange 
information (Daft and Lengel, 1986). Consequently, different subnetworks have to be 
intertwined and different routines have to be compatible, at least to a certain degree 
(Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; Miller and Friesen, 1982). This interdependence of 
subnetworks and routines sets limits to unit autonomy itself, as well as to the 
identified advantages of autonomy in terms of network diversity. 
Integration is thus required to overcome the drawbacks of differentiation. 
Alignment and coordination to obtain systemic integration and synergies from 
collaboration involve extensive communication (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), 
including „strategic conversations‟ (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996). Network 
redundancy is, therefore, not a source of inefficiency but a bare necessity to find 
sufficient common ground in developing joint cognitive frames and practices 
(Nonaka, 1994; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2008). A partial integration of different 
routines may also be required to obtain compatibility or alignment of interconnected 
product and process elements (Simon, 1973). At the same time, activities should not 
be so tightly integrated that there is, de facto, no longer a differentiated structure. This 
suggests that an intermediate degree of integration meets the need of alignment and 
coordination, while leaving ample room for differentiation. This assertion resonates 
with Maurer and Ebers‟ (2006) finding that, in small entrepreneurial firms, integration 
of relationship management leads to social network inertia if not accompanied by 
some relationship management differentiation. 
The focal cases show these effects of differentiation and integration. DSM has 
relatively autonomous Business Groups, each operating on differentiated product 
markets. The company also experiments with new activities, which are initially 
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protected in separate (external) units. As the CEO indicates, “We are also moving 
innovation into business development units so people can be free from the distraction 
of urgent tasks.” Later on, these novel activities are insourced and integrated with 
existing activities, provided they are sufficiently promising, so that these new, weak, 
and diverse ties enrich the existing social network. DSM also stimulates synergetic, 
cross-unit collaborative platforms, for instance, through the Corporate Strategy 
Dialogues, the Corporate Research Board, annual corporate conferences, and the DSM 
Business Academy. Bioterials, operating at the intersection of biotechnology and 
chemical processes, illustrates intensive collaboration across Business Groups. The 
company also integrates novel and existing activities in „Emerging Business Areas‟, 
which are – as an innovation manager explains – “areas where current market 
strongholds and technological capabilities align most precisely with societal and 
technological trends.”   
Philips Lighting has highly autonomous Business Groups, which hardly 
collaborate. According to a human resources manager, “I experience that all Business 
Groups are technology driven and quite closed. It is the history, it very much driven by 
where we come from as Lighting.” While the Division also shields new ventures (such 
as LED activities) in separate units, they are not actively integrated with existing 
activities. A Divisional Management Team member: “One needs to get a feeling of 
these new [recently acquired, innovative] businesses, which one does not get by 
integrating them. This gives rise to the fish bowl effect, where they [the new 
businesses] do their business and we have [the existing] businesses watch, certainly 
not interact or tell how they should behave, just watch.” As a result, while Philips 
Lighting increases the recency and diversity of its ties by acquiring innovative 
businesses, the different Business Groups are not actively integrated, which fosters the 
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development of local network clusters and hampers the maintenance of balanced 
network ties. 
Proposition 2: The combination of a high degree of differentiation and an 
intermediate degree of integration favours the development of balanced 
corporate networks.  
 
Formalisation 
While the above antecedents refer to the vertical and horizontal relations between 
different units, the way in which activities within different units are organised is also 
important. Formal rules (such as written codes of conduct and standard operating 
procedures) enable the behaviour of organisational members within specified bounds 
(cf. Kieser, Beck, and Tainio, 2001), while restricting the discretion or freedom that 
organisational members enjoy to organise activities as they deem most appropriate (cf. 
Thompson, 1969). 
Formalisation reduces uncertainty and complexity, enhances efficiency, 
provides an organisational memory of condensed experiences, and (de)legitimises 
actions by providing clear guidelines to organisational members as to expected and 
undesired behaviour (Kieser et al., 2001), thus providing the organisational backbone 
that avoids chaos (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). In complex organisations, these rules 
should be kept as clear and simple as possible to be effective (Eisenhardt and Bhatia, 
2002). Paradoxically, formalisation enables organisational members to act since 
official rules shield actors from the vagaries of personal or ingroup power games or 
cognitive frames (Kieser et al., 2001). While the contents of formal rules may be more 
or less enabling, rules free actors from the personal spheres of influence of other 
network actors since actors can legitimately develop new, diverse contacts and 
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practices. Especially rules that tolerate or encourage novelty and innovation stimulate 
network rejuvenation (Adler et al., 1999). By the same token, rules may also protect or 
stimulate the development of new routines, unconstrained by personal or ingroup 
influences.  
Formalisation also has its downsides in terms of maintaining balanced networks. 
Aiming at the achievement of standardisation of inputs, processes, or outputs 
(Mintzberg, 1979), formalisation may, purposefully or inadvertently, encourage 
single-mindedness, conformity, window dressing, and excessive control, and reduce 
commitment and creativity. These constraining effects of rigidity dissuade both the 
development of new, diverse network ties and the creation of novel routines. Formal 
rules induce actors to focus their limited attention on the explicitly stated goals and 
guidelines, thereby becoming blind to relevant yet unspecified environmental 
developments (Cyert and March, 1992). Conformity and isomorphic behaviour result 
from the widespread adoption of prevailing (formal) rules and practices (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983), which is at odds with „out-of-the-box‟ thinking. Window dressing 
is geared towards the apparent compliance with (formal) rules, rather than coping with 
adequate responses to evolving organisational problems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Stringent (formal) control acts as a straightjacket that thwarts deviant behaviour (Das 
and Teng, 2000). The decrease of commitment is a motivational brake on actors who 
should „go the extra mile‟ beyond present contacts and practices (Gagné and Deci, 
2005). Reduced creativity entails a lesser imagination of the opportunities of other 
contacts and practices (Kieser et al., 2001). Excessive formalisation thus fosters 
homogenisation, stabilisation, and strengthening of existing networks, as well as the 
perpetuation of existing routines.  
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A lack of formalisation thus fosters motivation and creativity since actors have 
the freedom to deploy new activities in their own ways. Identification with individual 
or team-developed projects and out-of-the-box thinking are strong stimuli to 
rejuvenate and diversify network ties. At the same time, this network reconfiguration 
may never materialise since new projects, in the absence of legitimising rules, 
encounter resistance from existing power configurations (Dougherty and Hardy, 
1996). Furthermore, the absence of rules that „push‟ actors to break through existing 
mental frames or practices may keep actors from actually seizing these opportunities 
(cf. Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). In sum, an intermediate level of formalisation, 
striking a middle ground between rigidity and flexibility (Das and Teng, 2000), 
favours the maintenance of balanced networks. Such an intermediate level of 
formalisation is reminiscent of the partial order of „semistructures‟, which prescribe 
some aspects of behaviour or outcomes but leave others open (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2007). These provide enough guidance 
and protection to develop new, diverse network ties and routines without stifling such 
initiatives through excessive rule-setting. 
The case companies illustrate the above argument. DSM has clear formal rules, 
such as those prescribing the Business Strategy Dialogues and the Corporate Strategy 
Dialogues. The company‟s Chief Technology Officer notes that “these consultations 
are innate to our existing structure of meetings. At my previous employers I have 
never seen such a [formally] structured process” (InterConnect, 2007). The company 
also grants considerable autonomy to its employees, but retains a certain degree of 
formal control. According to the CEO, “Often when people talk about innovation they 
talk giving employees‟ freedom to be innovative and out of that you will innovate. I 
don‟t believe that is the only element. I believe you also need [formal] boundaries.” 
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The company‟s ample, but not unlimited room for deploying new activities is 
exemplified by the discretion to engage in numerous spin-offs, spin-ins, and 
collaborative platforms with external actors in specific areas, which have been 
formally designated by DSM‟s Top Management Team. The intermediate level of 
formalisation at DSM has been conducive to the maintenance of a balanced network. 
Philips Lighting, with its focused network, is a highly formalised organisation. It 
has traditionally been a bureaucratic organisation and top managers have, despite 
repetitive attempts, not succeeded in substantively changing this imprint (Metze, 
1997). The bureaucratic character is evidenced by the high number of formal 
meetings, the production of endless series of staff reports to support decision-making,  
and the development of a series of control instruments. Standardised quantitative tools 
and methods (such as key performance indicators, business-balanced scorecards, and 
process survey tools) are extensively used to achieve operational  excellence and “to 
avoid that we re-invent the wheel.”  These formal instruments are advocated using 
slogans such as “what doesn‟t get measured doesn‟t get done,” “expect what you 
inspect,” and “you are your numbers.” As an employee echoes, “I know that to be 
successful in my job, I have to be result-driven and make my deliverables and 
progress visible to the management.” The Division‟s extensive formalisation is also 
illustrated by its management development programme and succession planning, 
where two potential successors are appointed for each key position. The high degree 
of formalisation at Philips Lighting is not conducive to the establishment of new, 
diverse, and weak ties.  
Proposition 3: An intermediate level of formalisation fosters the development of 
balanced corporate networks.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We have analysed the endogenous dynamics of social networks and the different ways 
in which organisations intervene with these dynamics. While several studies (Koka et 
al., 2006; Hite and Hesterly, 2001; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Baum et al., 2003; 
Powell et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2006; Maurer and Ebers, 2006) have addressed 
network dynamics, these studies have focused on start-ups, small entrepreneurial 
firms, interorganisational relations, or organisational fields. Our study adds to these 
contributions by addressing social network dynamics of mature firms at the 
organisational level. In particular, we focused on why and how organisational 
networks evolve – in terms of changes in the diversity, duration, and strength of ties. 
We developed a theoretical argument and performed comparative case studies to 
further shape our ideas. Iterating between our conceptual ideas and field observations, 
we came to convergent insights, in that the social networks of organisations are 
subject to endogenous dynamics that increasingly privilege bonding over bridging ties, 
but that these dynamics are influenced by the structural antecedents of organisations. 
Network configurations are important because they constitute the informational 
infrastructure of organisations and are, as a result, an important determinant of their 
capabilities (Gobbo and Olsson, 2010). Bridging networks are conducive to 
exploration, while bonding networks foster the exploitation of existing activities. Our 
theoretical argument and empirical insights suggest that the increasing importance of 
bonding networks predispose organisations ever more towards an exploitative 
trajectory. This entails the danger that highly focused organisations can no longer 
effectively respond to environmental changes. Rather than adopting a deterministic 
view in which „unfitting‟ organisations are outselected (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, 
1989), we linked managerial intentionality to network adaptation in order to explain 
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how business organisations can coevolve with their changing environments (Lewin 
and Volberda, 1999; Volberda and Lewin, 2003). In particular, we identified three 
types of organisational antecedents that help organisations to counter endogenous 
„focusing‟ dynamics and maintain balanced networks that enable organisations to 
simultaneously meet short-term exploitative demands and keep abreast of longer-term, 
substantive changes. 
On theoretical grounds, illustrated by empirical observations, we conclude that 
organisations with the „right‟ structural antecedents seek to continuously balance their 
social networks in order to coevolve, in a progressive and timely way, with their 
business environments. The empirical evidence also suggests that organisations with 
„underdeveloped‟ structural antecedents pass through less frequent but much more 
profound network adaptations to acquire more bridging ties when their existing 
networks of predominantly bonding ties no longer suffice to respond to environmental 
jolts (such as disruptive external innovations) or initiate strategic changes (like 
reducing time-to-market). The importance of organisational structure is elucidated by 
our empirical insight that DSM, the organisation with the more interconnected units –  
which on conceptual grounds was likely to follow a punctuated equilibrium trajectory 
since interdependence thwarts progressive adjustment (Gupta et al., 2006) – made 
more frequent and progressive network adjustments than Philips Lighting, the 
organisation with the more autonomous units, because DSM had designed its 
organisational structure in a way that facilitates progressive network adjustments.  
Our finding with regard to the importance of combining clear differentiation and 
a certain degree of integration resounds with insights from the ambidexterity 
literature, which argues that this combination is conducive to the organisational ability 
to simultaneously exploit and explore (Duncan, 1976; Tushman and O‟Reilly, 1996; 
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O‟Reilly and Tushman, 2004; De Visser et al., 2010). However, several of our 
findings deviate significantly from those of the ambidexterity literature, which 
contends that a high degree of decentralisation and a low level of formalisation are 
conducive to ambidexterity. Our reasoning with regard to social network dynamics 
and our comparative case analysis lead to the more nuanced suggestion that both 
complete decentralisation and the absence of formalisation may actually promote 
network focus, and thus, over time, be detrimental to ambidexterity. Just like free 
markets only blossom when an adequate set of centrally issued, formal „rules of the 
game‟ are in place (North, 1990), organisations will only retain their scope and 
adaptability when organisational structures are in place which both enable and 
constrain. This insight resonates with the constructs of „semistructure‟ (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997), „hypertext organization‟ (Nonaka, 1994), „flexible firm‟ (Volberda, 
1996), and „internal tensions‟ (Das and Teng, 2000), which we have extended and 
applied to corporate social networks. 
Our study is characterised by several limitations. We addressed only the impact 
of structural antecedents on corporate network development and routines, thus 
ignoring the role of other important types of antecedents, such as culture, emotions, 
incentives, and technology (Cohen, 2007; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2003). We analysed one organisation at the corporate level and the other 
at the divisional level, which somewhat complicates the comparability. We collected 
primary data over a period of about three years; a longer time span would have 
provided a completer evolutionary picture. Our empirical evidence consists of two 
focal organisations, which engenders the risk of context-specific outcomes. Our 
contribution should, above all, be seen as an exploratory study that has started filling 
an important gap in the literature by generating propositions on the dynamic interplay 
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of organisational structures, networks, and capabilities. Follow-up studies should 
assess the empirical robustness of our statements and the relative importance of the 
proposed structural antecedents in shaping the endogenous process of corporate 
network evolution.  
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